The Signal Fiasco: A Glaring Breach in Trump’s Inner Circle
In a surprising twist, Jeffrey Goldberg, editor-in-chief of The Atlantic and a known skeptic of President Donald Trump, found himself accidentally added to a Signal group chat titled “Houthi PC small group.” This wasn’t just any chat. It discussed airstrikes on Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthis on March 15, 2025.
The incident, while eyebrow-raising, offers a chance to reflect on how sensitive information is handled at the highest levels—and where improvements might be needed.
The chat, which included top Trump administration officials, like Vice President JD Vance, National Security Advisor Mike Waltz, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, and Director of National Intelligence Tulsi Gabbard, was a hub of serious deliberation. Officials weighed airstrike plans, economic ripple effects—like trade through the Suez Canal and oil prices—diplomatic considerations, and how to frame the operation publicly. They debated timing, public understanding, and alignment with Trump’s foreign policy goals.
The airstrikes went ahead successfully, with figures like Waltz later speaking openly about them, indirectly confirming the chat’s legitimacy to Goldberg. He quietly observed sensitive details—upcoming strikes, weapons, targets—before leaving, later calling the setup “shockingly reckless.” That no one authorized to be in the chat noticed Goldberg there does raise fair questions about operational security, even if it was a one-off mistake.
The National Security Council quickly stepped in, confirming the chat’s authenticity but chalking up Goldberg’s inclusion to a simple error—possibly mixing him up with trade negotiator Jaimeson Greer. They stressed the Houthi operation’s success and assured there was no real threat to national security. Trump, for his part, said he wasn’t aware of the incident. It’s an awkward moment for sure, but one that seems more like a human slip than a systemic collapse. Still, it’s worth asking: How did this happen, and what can be learned?
One question stands out: Why are top US officials using Signal, a popular consumer-grade encrypted app, for such sensitive talks? It’s secure enough for privacy-conscious folks, but is it the right fit for the Executive Branch’s needs? Signal can’t fully guard against human error—like adding the wrong person—and it’s not tailored for the kind of structured, auditable communication government work often demands. That’s not to say it’s a bad tool, just that it might not be the best one for this work.
Then there’s the curious detail of Goldberg’s connection. The Atlantic has been consistently critical of Trump, so it’s odd that someone in his inner circle had Goldberg’s contact handy—or close enough to confuse with Greer’s. Was it a leftover from some prior outreach? A typo in a rushed moment? It’s a suspiciously confounding, and while it doesn’t necessarily point to foul play, it’s a reminder that even small oversights can lead to unexpected exposure.
This incident also brings up a bigger issue: Why hasn’t the government developed a custom, secure communication system by now?
Past controversies—like Hillary Clinton’s private server or Joe Biden’s classified document woes—sparked plenty of debate about safeguarding information. Both cases were messy, and both sides pointed fingers. Yet here we are in 2025, still relying on third-party apps rather than an internal platform designed to keep outsiders out, intentionally or not. It’s not about blaming anyone; it’s about recognizing a gap that keeps cropping up, administration after administration.
The Pentagon is already on the case, investigating leaks of national security information with potential criminal charges in play. A memo from Hegseth’s chief of staff last Friday flagged “recent unauthorized disclosures” and promised prosecution for leakers. This Signal mix-up could easily fall under that umbrella—Goldberg’s peek into the chat wasn’t authorized, even if it was allegedly accidental. The Trump team is no stranger to chasing leaks; DHS Secretary Kristi Noem is ramping up polygraphs to plug leaks at her agency. It’s a tough stance, and it’s consistent, but it also puts pressure on the administration to handle its own missteps credibly.
Take Mike Waltz. If he’s the one who added Goldberg by mistake, it’s a tough spot. The administration has made it clear they don’t tolerate leaks, intentional or not. Should Waltz take the fall to prove that point? Maybe, maybe not—he’s a key player, and it was likely an honest error. But if the zero-tolerance line holds, someone’s got to own it. That’s the tricky balance here: enforcing accountability without overreacting to a fluke.
Goldberg’s cameo in the chat wasn’t a disaster—the operation succeeded, and no real harm was done. But it’s a wake-up call. It’s not about tearing down the administration; they’ve got a tough enough job righting our lost ship after the torpedoes of the Obama and Biden years, and mistakes happen. Still, it highlights a need for tighter processes.
Why not invest in a system that locks out these risks? Why lean on Signal when something purpose-built could do better? And why not double-check who’s on the line before hitting send? These aren’t indictments—they’re practical questions.
The Trump team has handled bigger challenges than this, and they’ll likely face more. The Houthi strikes worked, after all. But if they want to keep sensitive plans airtight, they might take this as a nudge to rethink their approach—not out of failure, but out of a chance to get stronger.
Goldberg called it reckless, and maybe it was too loose. The public just wants to know the next slip won’t be the one that creates a mushroom cloud. A little tweak now could save a lot of headaches later.
Never should've happened and something just smells fishy. I agree on your point that we are the "most powerful country on the planet" and our best have to use an app that we all can use.